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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CENTRAL BANK & TRUST
COlYIPANY, a corporation; EARL
S. CHILD, et if. Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.
YV. S. BRilYIHALL, Commissioner of
Financial Institutions; FIRST
SECURITY CORPORATION, a
bank holding company; and FIRST
SECURITY STATE BANK OF
SPRINGYILLE, an unincorporated
association,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
12636

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arises from two actions originally brought
hy plaintiffs Child, et al. and a third action by plaintiff
Central Bank & Trust Company, seeking declaratory
relief, mandamus, and judicial review under Section
7-1-:,W, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, concerning the approyal by ,V. S. Brimhall, Commissioner of Financial
1

Institutions for Utah, of First Security Corporation's
application to organize a unit bank in Springville, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
All actions were consolidated. At the conclusion of
the trial in Salt Lake County District Court, Honorable
Aldon J. Anderson upheld the Commissioner's decisions, by granting judgment in favor of defendants and
dismissing the actions of all plaintiffs.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Respondents First Security Corporation, First Security State Bank of Springville, and ,V.
S. Brimhall, Commissioner, seek affirmance of the
judgment of the District Court.
STATE1\1ENT OF THE FACTS
Respondents do not disagree with the facts stated
in briefs of appellants but set forth some additional
facts which are necessary to have the case in proper
perspective.
On February 13, 1970, respondent First Security
Corporation (herein called the "holding company")
applied to the respondent Commissioner of Financial
Institutions of the State of Utah for permission to orgamze the First Security State Bank of Springville.
2

At a public hearing held before the Commissioner, all
of the parties to the present action were given an opportunity to present their arguments and to submit briefs.
The Commissioner on August 5, 1970, issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order, granting the
application. (The documents from the Commissioner's
off ice are contained in the envelope of exhibits pertaining to the application of First Security Corporation.
Where applicable, the transcript of the proceedings
before the Commissioner will be referred to as "TR-,"
and the transcrigt of the proceedings before the Lower
Court as "CT-)The Commissioner's conclusions numbered ten and eleven, together with the Order, required
that First Security Corporation obtain approval for the
acquisition of shares of the new bank from the Federal
Reserve Board, and that deposit insurance be obtained
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
On November 25, 1970, the Federal Reserve Board
granted the application of First Security Corporation
to acquire the shares of the new bank (CT. 11 and Fed.
Res. Bull., Dec., 1970, p. 952). Immediately prior to
the opening of the bank for business, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation approved the deposit insurance
(CT. 11). On February 22, 1971, the Commissioner
filed the Articles of Incorporation for the bank, bearing
his written approval, with the Secretary of State for
the State of Utah, and a Certificate of Incorporation
was issued bearing that date. The bank thereby became
a valid legal entity under the banking and corporation
laws of Utah. On the same date, the bank opened for

3

business in Springville (CT. 10). The required capital
and surplus of $200,000 (Finding No. 15) was paid
in cash to the bank on that date (CT. 21) , the organizational meeting of the Board of Directors was held ,
and other steps taken to qualify the bank for continued
business (CT. 11). As conceded by plaintiffs (CT. 22),
the conditions of Commissioner Brimhall's Order had
been complied with and the bank became operational
in the City of Springville.
Parallelling the above events, appellants Child,
et aL, had on February 25, 1970, filed an application
with the Commissioner, similar to that of First Security
Corporation, also asking for permission to organize
a state bank in Springville. The Commissioner's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of August 5,
1970, granting the holding company's application, had
the effect of requiring denial of the application of appellants Child, et al,.
Subsequently, appellant Central Bank & Trust
Company, which had appeared as a protesting party in
all proceedings before the Commissioner because it is
the only other bank presently in Springville, filed an
action in the lower court which was consolidated with
two similar actions filed by appellants Child, et al. This
appeal results from an affirmative decision in favor of
respondents and upholding the Commissioner's actions.

4

ARGUMENT
1. APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE

.FIRST SECURITY STATE BANK OF
SPRINGVILLE IS A "BRANCH BANK" IS
IlVIMATERIAL TO THIS CASE AND IS
\VITHOUT MERIT.
A.Neither the Commissioner nor the State Courts
Possess Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Rule Upon
the Branch Bank Issue.
The ct'::quisition of a
bank on the part
of a bank holding company is exclusively governed by
federal law:
" (a) It shall be unlawful, except with the prior
approval of the Board, * * * (3) for any bank
holding company to acquire direct or indirect
ownership or control of any voting shares of any
bank, if, after such acquisition, such company will
directly or indirectly own or control more than 5
per centum of the voting shares of such bank;

... "12

u.s.c.

§ 1842 (1969).

" ( c) The Board shall not approve- * * * (2)
any other proposed acquisition or merger or consolidation under this section whose effect in any
section of the country may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which in any
would be i!1
restraint of trade, unless it fmds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transactions
are clearly outweighed in the public interest by
the probable effect of the transaction in
the convenience and needs of the commumty to
be served." 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1969).

5

Under the above cited provisions of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, as amended, the Federal Reserve
Board is to rule on all acquistions by bank holding
companies. While the present proceedings have been
in progress, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
has been further amended to provide for Federal Reserve Board regulation of holding companies owning
even one bank, such amendments serving to underscore
the primacy of federal law in many aspects of banking,
and the overriding authority of the Federal Reserve
Board to rule on holding company matters including,
as in the present case, interpretation of state law. (See
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970,
Sec. 102, 84 Stat. 1763).
Because the Board has exclusive jurisdiction
in bank holding company matters, no state authority has jurisdiction to deny a state bank application
by a holding company based on the argument that
the application entails a violation of state law. In
the United States Supreme Court case of Whitney
National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U.S. 411
( 1965), the Federal Reserve Board had approved a
plan for a Louisiana bank holding company to organize
a national bank. The state then passed a statute making
it illegal for a holding company to organize a new bank.
The state bank sought a review of the Board's action
in the Fifth Circuit. Meanwhile, the state bank also
brought suit in the District of Columbia against the
United States Comptroller of the Currency to prevent
him from granting to the bank a certificate of authority.
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The granting of an injunction by the trial court was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and then reversed
by the United States Supreme Court, on the basis that
the District Court had no jurisdiction inasmuch as exclusive jurisdiction was reposed in the Federal Reserve
Board.
The Supreme Court first noted that the Bank
Holdmg Company Act of 1956 prohibited a bank holding company from acquiring ownership or control of a
national bank, new or existing, without the approval
of the Federal Reserve Board. The Court further noted
that the Comptroller of the Currency was given the function of authorizing the acquisition and that such action
was necessary in addition to that of the Board approval.
With the background laid the Court then turned to the
primary contention of the respondent in the action,
namely, that the acquisition of the new bank by the
bank holding company amounted to the establishment
of a branch bank, in violati)on of Louisiana law. The
Court then noted that if the respondent's argument
were correct, the Board would be compelled to disapprove the arrangement inasmuch as a plan which was
of state law would not be consistent with
the federal statute (12 U.S.C. §1842 (c)) that no bank
holding company should be expanded beyond the limits
consistent with public interest:
"The Board could not approve a holding company arrangement involving the o:ganization and
opening of a new bank the openmg of t?e bank.
by reason of its ownership by a bank holdmg com-
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pany, would be prohibited by a valid state law."

Id., 379 U.S. at 419.

In specific consideration of these points the Court stated:
"We believe Congress intended the statutory proceedings before the Board to be the sole means
by
questions as to the organization or operation of a new bank by a bank holding company
may he tested." Id., 379 U.S. at 419.
The Court then noted that the Comptroller ( analgous
to the State Commissioner in the present case) had no
authority to veto
act of the Board which gave approval to the acquist:ion of a new bank:
"This legislative history clearly indicates that
Congress had no intention to give the Comptroller
a veto over the Board in such cases. It follows
that it is the exclusive function of the Board to
act in such cases and contests must be pursued
before it, not before the Comptroller." (Emphasis supplied) Id., 379 U.S. at 419, 420.
From this the Court concluded that the sole means of appeal from a decision of the Federal Reserve Board
(under 12 U.S.C. §1842) was with the United States
Court of Appeals:
"We think these Congressional actions point clearly to the conclusion that it [Congress] intended
that challenges to Board approval of the organization and operation of a new bank by a bank
holding company be pursued solely as provided
in the statute. * * * Congress has set out in the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 a carefully
planned and comprehensive method for challeng·
ing Board determination. That action by Con·
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gress. was designed to permit an agency, expert in
banking matters, to explore and pass on the ramifications of a proposed bank holding company
arrangement. 'To permit a district court to make
the initial determination of a plan's prop-riety
would substantially decrease the effectiveness of
the statutory design." (Emphasis supplied) Id.,
379 U.S. at 420, 421.
The Court thus found that the only entity which was
to pass upon the question as to whether or not the organization of a new bank by a bank holding company
was violative of the state branch banking law was the
Federal Reserve Board. Reference was then made to
the fact that the District Court in that action had held
that the proposed bank was in substance a mere "branch"
bank of the holding company and was thus barred by
state law. The Supreme Court stated:
"We believe that these are the very types of questions that Congress has committed to the Board,
and we hold that the Board should make the determination of the plan's propriety in the first instance." Id., 379 U.S. at 421.
Lastly, the Court stated the rationale for its decision,
noting that any other decision would result in conflicting opinions from various bodies (just as in the case
before this Court) .
here, just as the plaintiff in Whitney,
seek a decision which would be in conflict with that of
the Federal Reserve Board. The Whitney Court, considering the reason for the Board's exclusive jurisdiction,
stated by way of conclusion:
9

" ... [TJhe Federal Reserve Board, with its expertise in the banking field, should make the initial determination of the propriety of the plan of
?rg3:nization giving full consideration to the legislative guidelines set out in the Act. Section 7 of
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, [citaprovides: 'The enactment by Congress of
this chapter shall not be construed as preventing
any State from exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it now has or may hereafter have
with respect to banks, bank holding companies,
and subsidiaries thereof.' Here the Board has not
had an opportunity to determine the applicability
and effect of the new Louisiana statute. We are
of the opinion that this is the very type of question that Congress envisioned as being resolved in
the first instance by the Board." (Emphasis supplied) Id., 379 U.S. at 424, 425.
Thus the case was dismissed inasmuch as the lower
courts lacked subject mater . jurisdiction. It is interesting to note that appellant Central misconstrued this
landmark Supreme Court decision, and in an attempt
to minimize the jurisdictional issue quoted the decision
of the circuit court and made only paranthetical reference to the Supreme Court decision on page 16 of its
brief.
The reasoning of the Whitney decision a pplies
in the instant case. If the Federal Reserve Board is
to be the initial and sole arbiter of violations of state
law in this area, then clearly a state administrative
authority such as the Commissioner here, just as the
Comptroller of the Currency in the Whitney case, has
no jurisdiction to pass upon questions of a holding
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company application and thus possibly create a decision
in confiict with the Federal Reserve Board. Respondents seek not to minimize the authority of the Commissioner within his proper sphere, for he must determine that proper state procedures have been taken and
review certain economic matters. Respondents do emphasize the controlling federal law in the areas involving
holding company acquisition.
Further, any argument with the decision of the
Federal Reserve Board should be taken before the
U.S. Court of Appeals, and not to a state court. As
noted in the record, the Federal Reserve Board has
approved the application of First Security Corporation
for the unit bank in Springville. It is significant that
appellant Central, through its attorney Peter W. Billings, entered an appearance before and filed a memorandum with the Federal Reserve Board. It is also
significant that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation approved the deposit insurance for First
Security State Bank of Si,>ringville. Opposing counsel,
S. Rex Lewis, formerly general counsel for the F.D.l.C.,
and presumably familiar with federal law and procedures, made no appearance either before the F.D.I.C.
or the Federal Reserve Board in connection with the
application of First Security Corporation.
A verv recent Maine decision has specifically stated
that the Whitney case is authority for the proposition
that a state banking commission has no jurisdiction
to refuse an application by a bank holding company
for the organization of a new state bank on the basis

11

that such organization is in violation of state branch
banking laws. In the case of William B. Nealley, ct al.,
and Claude F. Clement, et al. v. Robert A.. Brown (substituted for Elmer W. Campbell) in his capacity a.v
Acting Bank Commissioner of the State of Maine, No.
736 (Me., filed Dec. 2, 1971), the Bank Commissioner
of Maine had refused applications by two different bank
holding companies to organize two new trust companies.
The Commissioner's decision was based upon the reasoning that each new company would, in effect, be a
"branch" of already existing trust companies held by
the holding companies in question in different counties.
The statute in question stated:
"No trust company shall establish or operate a
branch or agency until it shall have received a
warrant to do so from the Commissioner, who
shall issue such warrant only when satisfied that
public convenience and advantage will be promoted thereby .... No trust company shall be permitted to establish or operate a branch or agency
except within the county ot its main of£ice or in
county adjoining that of its main office....
Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. 9 §1003 (Supp. 1970).
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in affirming
a reversal by the Superior Court of the Commissioner's
order, stated:
" ... [U]nder the impact of Constitutionally governing federal law, the Bank
lacks
power and
to render. a decis10n
portedly final, in which he predicated a lack .o±
public convenience and adv3:ntage upon essential
relationships of a bank holdmg company to new
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trust companies being established, and to be operated, under bank holding company control."
Nealley v. Brown, preliminary text at 2.
The Court, in a more specific analysis of the situation,
stated that the Bank Commissioner held as he did
because of the intertwining relationships between (a)
the bank holding company, (b) a main subsidiary of
the bank holding company, and ( c) the proposed new
bank, specifically the interlocking directorates, incorporators, and officers. Thus, the Court concluded that:
"The Bank Commissioner could rationally arrive
at the determination that the trust companies proposed to be created would, in substance, be
'branches' of the already existing trust company,
.. ."Id., at 3.
Justice Wernick, speaking for the Court, then turned
to the Whitney case (discussed above), stating that
that case was "plainly operative and must be held to be
here controlling as the supreme law of the land binding
upon the state courts under the supremacy clause of
the Constitution of the United States." Id., at 4. The
Court then summarized Whitney as follows:
"The decision of Whitney establishes, as governing principles, that by the enactment of the Federal Bank Holding Company Act ... Congress
reposed originril and exclusive jurisdiction in the
Federal
Board, subject to review only
by an appropriate United States Court of Appeals ... to assess and decide the propriety,-including the applicability and effect not only of
federal but also of state law,-of any arrangement in which a bank holding company has a

13

position of control in the organization and
operat10n of a new trust company.'' Id., at 4.
The Court then established, at some length, the fact
that (a) Whitney applied even though it involved a
national bank, and ( b) it made no difference at what
stage in time a challenge to the Federal Reserve Board's
authority was made (indicating that a state decision
prior to the Board's still challenged the Board's jurisdiction):
"Other language used by the Court throughout
the opinion makes overwhelmingly clear that the
character of the bank being created, as national
rather than state-chartered, as well as the stage at
which the national or state administrative supervisory authority is required to enter-whether
after organization of the corporation and prior to
the commencement of business or whether during
the corporate organizational process itself-were
immaterial to the scope of the decision." Id., at 4.
The Maill:1Court then quoted extensively from Whitney
language which referred to "a new bank" or "an existing
bank" but did not refer specifically to a national bank.
The reasoning of the Court as to Whitney's applicability to state banks was three-fold: ( 1) Whitney
was founded solely on a law which applied to all bank
holding companies, namely the Bank Holding Company
Act; ( 2) there was inherent logic in giving original
and exclusive jurisdiction to the uniquely expert Federal
Reserve Board; and ( 3), the legislative history of the
Bank Holding Company Act indicated that proposed
provisions giving the appropriate state authority a vet0
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over the Board were rejected in favor of an appeal to
the Circuit Court of Appeals. Thus, concluded the
Court:
" ... L'l'Jhese Congressional actions point clearly to
the conclusion that it intended that challenges to
... be pursued solely as provided
m the statute. Id., at 7.
Lastly, the Court followed the Whitney decision
reasoning through and applied it to the case before it,
noting particularly the fact that the Federal Reserve
Board had a unique expertise in the area of banking
and that the question before the Commissioner in the
Maine case was exactly the type of question which should
be decided by that Board. The Court noted that if the
Bank Commissioner of Maine were allowed to make
a final decision, then:
" ... [T}he Federal Reserve Board would be deprived entirely of the opportunity and power to
evaluate and decide the issues. Thus, 'the commands of the Congress would be completely frustrated.' It was precisely to prevent such likelihood
that the court in Whitney held the function and
jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve Board in the
premises to be both original and exclusive." Id.,
at 9.
The Court concluded that the Maine Bank Commissioner did have the power under the law of Maine to
decide questions of public convenience and advantage,
but that the Commissioner lacked the jurisdiction to
act in making a final decision "grounded on factors
intimately involved in the total relationship of bank

15

holding companies to banking corporations which they
own, or control-i.e., whether 'chain' or 'bank holding
company affiliate' banking is involved rather than
'branch' banking." Id., at 12.
The Nealley v. Brown decision is as closely on point
to the present situation as a case can be. Thus, in the
instant case, the decision of the Federal Reserve Board
concerning the First Security State Bank of Springville may be challenged only in the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, and the Commissioner acted correctly in
granting the application, having no jurisdiction to deny
the application on the basis that it entailed a violation
of state law.
The Commissioner's factual and legal determinations in the case before this Court were in total harmony
with the decision of the Federal Reserve Board. Therefore, the Utah Supreme Court is not called upon to
resolve any conflict between federal and state laws, but
rather to affirm a judgment which upholds proper
determinations by both federal and state authorities.
B. Assuming, Arguendo, that Jurisdiction is
Present, The Incorporation of the First Security State Bank of Springville by Respondent Holding Company is Not In Violation of
Utah's Branch Banking Laws.
I. The First Security State Bank of Spring-

ville is neither a subsidiary nor a branch of
any other bank.

Section 7-3-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended states:

16

"All banking houses and branches shall be loc'.lted either within the corporate limits of a
city or town, or within unincorporated areas
of a county in which a city of the first class
is located."
This statute makes no mention of bank holding compauies and thus does not apply to the inst ant case.Appellant Central's brief deals exclusively with issues of
"branch or unit" attempting to demonstrate that the
First Security State Bank of Springville is in effect
a branch. However, nowhere does either appellant indicate or allege that that Bank is a branch of any other
bank. Rather, appellant has taken a large amount of
space demonstrating the obvious; namely, that a corporation has a number of ties with its subsidiaries.
Certainly, respondent holding company does not deny
that it has connections with its subsidiaries. Appellants
have been unable to demonstrate that any other particular bank in the holding company system does exercise or will exercise control over the new unit so as to
make it a branch.
There exists no "unitary" operation between the
state-chartered bank and the parent holding company,
for the latter does not conduct a banking business. It
is a father-son relationship with both financial support
and management services flowing from father to son.
Typical of human experience also, the child (bank)
can perform many acts from which the parent is prohibited. In sum, the holding company is not a bank.
Concerning §7-3-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, appellants have cited the Utah Supreme Court decision of
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Walker Bank and Trust Company v. Taylor, 15 U.2d
234, 390 P .2d 592 ( 1964) , which stands for the proposition that Section 7-3-6 is to be interpreted in a restrictive manner. Respondent First Security Corporation has no argument with this interpretation; in fact,
this argument works against appellants. A strict interpretation means that when the statute applies to "every
bank," then any other type of institution, including a
holding company, is excluded. In other words, the
statute means exactly what it says and cannot be expanded by appellants through a liberal, interpretation
to be taken to include holding companies in the definition of the term "bank."
Turning specifically to appellants' argument, the
Court is told that defendant holding company is guilty
of "subterfuge" and "circumvention" of the branch
banking laws of Utah by establishing a unit bank in
a city where a branch of a bank could not be lawfully
placed. In fact, no subterfuge exists unless it is a sub·
terfuge to follow the clear direction of Section 7-1-26,
U.C.A. which permits the de nova organization of a
bank. In the organization of the Springville Bank the
organizer, incorporators, and shareholders obtained
directly what they had the right to obtain. (The question
of who paid for the qualifying shares is a mere technical
formality (CT. 9). Directors retain voting and dividend
rights along with other incidents of ownership.)
Another indication that Section 7-3-6 was not meant
to apply to bank holding companies may be seen when
we examine the statutes of other states where the legis-
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latures have specifically dealt with the problem. For
example, the Georgia statutes specifically state:
"Any ?ank? bank holding company, or company
... which violates Section 13-203 ( c), prohibiting
the establishment of new branch banks, ... shall
upon conviction, be fined not less than $500 nor
more than $5,000 ... " (Emphasis supplied) Code
of Georgia Ann., §13-9938 (1967).
Section 13-201.1 ( e) of the Georgia Code specifically
defines the term "bank holding company." Thus, if the
Utah Legislature desires that its statutes concerning
branch banking shall apply to bank holding companies,
it is free to pass a statute specifically mentioning such
companies as the legislature of Georgia has seen fit to
do. A number of other states have passed specific
legislation concerning holding companies. See, e.g.,
Consol. Laws of New York Ann. Art. 3-A, §141 et. seq.
(McKinney 1971) (Section 142 of the New York Code
spends four pages on bank holding companies); Ill.
Ann. Stat. title 16V2 §73 (1963); N. J. Stat. Ann. 17:
9A-345, (1963). The fact that a number of other states
have passed specific legislation concerning bank holding companies while Utah makes no mention of such
companies indicates that the Utah law is not meant
to restrict such companies. Appellants have not been
able to cite any Utah law which states that restrictions
on branch banking apply to holding companies.
The case law which is available concerning this
problem strongly supports the position of respondents.
A recent Eighth Circuit case is highly favorable to the
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position of the holding company. In Commercial National Bank of Little Rock v. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, No. 20, 607 (8th Cir., filed
Nov. 12, 1971), a company had applied to the Federal
Reserve Board for approval to become a bank holding
company. Plaintiff in the case protested at the Federal
Reserve Board hearing, but the petition of the company
was granted; plaintiff then appealed to the Circuit
Court. As stated in the Circuit Court Decision:
"It is argued that a multi-bank holding company
such as SABCO is, in effect, engaged in branch
banking and should come under Arkansas branch
banking restrictions. Pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Arkansas is free to
prohibit, by specific legislation, the formation of
bank holding companies .... However, the Legislative history (of that Act) indicates that Congress did not intend that the Bank Holding Company Act automatically makes state branch banking restrictions applicable to bank holding companies. S. Rep. No. 1095, Part I, 84th Cong.,
First Sess. 11 (1955) ."Id., at C-20.
It is significant that the Court indicated that Arkansas
needed "specific legislation" in order to regulate bank
holding companies. The Court then went on to consider
the relationship between the bank holding company
and the proposed bank to be acquired:
"In this case, there is substantial evidence in the
record to indicate that the relationship between
SABCO and its subsidiaries did not represent the
kind of unitary relation that was unlawful under
Arkansas branch banking laws ... Both banks
will continue to be operated by local officers. Each
20

is a separate co_rl?oration with its own capital, surplus, and und1v1ded profit. Each will have
its own loan limit based on its own capital and
surplus. Worthen [the Bank already owned by
the bank holding company] will be supervised by
the Arkansas Bank Commissioner, AFNB [the
proposed acquisition] by the Comptroller of the
Currency, and FABCO by the Federal Reserve
Board .... It is clear that vVorthen and AFNB
will cooperate in the future, but '* * * it is not
enough to show that common control, through
stock ownership by (a bank) which participates
actively in the management of its subsidiaries,
produced cooperation * * * between the subsidiaries. This is a usual, though not necessary, result of common ownership and control.' First Na-

tional Bank in Billings v. First Bank Stock
Corp., supra at 942." Id., at P-21.
The Billings case cited by the Circuit Court will

be considered below; however, note here the great similarity in fact situations between the Commercial case
and the present case. Similar to the situation in Commercial, First Security Corporation' s largest bank
(First Security Bank of Utah, N .A.) is a national bank
and is governed by different laws and regulatory
authorities than the state bank in Springville. Note
also that in spite of the connections between the already
existing bank of the holding company and the proposed acquisition bank of the holding company in
Commercial, the Court, under the Billings test, found
that there was no violation of the Arkansas branch
hanking law. Lastly, it is to be emphasized that in the
present case, the Federal Reserve Board has approved
the application of First Security Corporation. Note
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the language concerning such an action by the Board
in the Commercial case:
"The decisive test is whether a unitary operation
exist. The Federal Reserve Board has determmed that it will not. Its expert conclusions on
this
are entitled to great weight. As these
conclus10ns are supported by substantial eviwe will not reverse the Board even though
we might reach a contrary conclusion even though
we were making the initial decision on the matter." Id., at P-22.
It is urged that this Court, likewise, will not render
a decision which would, in effect, disrupt the expert
decisions which have already been made concerning
the First Security State Bank of Springville by the
Federal Reserve Board.

The case of First National Bank in Billings v. First
Bank Stock Corporation, 306 F. 2d 937 (9th Cir. 1962),
is also controlling in the present controversy. There a
"foreign" registered bank holding company, First Bank
Stock Corporation, Minneapolis, Minnesota, owned a
national bank (Midland) operating in Billings, Montana. The holding company desired another banking
facility in a new shopping center in Billings, but the
state law prohibited branch banking. After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a national bank charter, the
holding company caused a new state bank (Valley) to
be incorporated and itself applied to the Montana
Superintendent of Banks for an authorization which
was eventually granted. In a suit by competing banks
and holding companies one of several issues was whether

22

'

the new state bank was, in reality, a branch of the existing national bank owned by the same holding company.
The Court affirmed the lower Court judgment in all
respects and held that the new state bank was not a
branch of the existing national bank. The language
and holding of the Court are very much in point with
the present case and controlling of this issue:
"We find nothing in the agreed facts indicating
that Valley is a 'branch' of Midland. What must
appellants show, to establish that Valley is such a
branch? They must show, that, in substance, Midland is doing business through the instrumentality
of Valley or vice versa, in the same way as if the
institutions were one.

* * *

"On the other hand, it is not enough for appellants to show that common control, through stock
ownership by First Bank Stock, which participates actively in the management of its subsidiaries, produces cooperation or even eliminates
competition between the subsidiaries. This is a
usual, although not necessary, result of common
ownership and control.

* * *

" ... each is a separate corporation, with its own
captial, surplus, and undivided profits; each has a
separate banking house; each has its own employees; one is a national bank, the other a state
bank, and thus they operate under different
utes and are supervised by different authorities;
Midland is and will be Valley's chief (but not its
onlv) correspondent bank; Midland will probably (we think the 'probably' can be eliminated)
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participate in taking over the excess of certain
loans which Valley is unable to handle; ...

* * *
". . . Valley .has and maintains its own books of
account, has its own stationery, checks and forms
none of which mentions Midland; ... " Id., 306
F. 2d at 942.
Further, the Court concluded:

"It is plain to us that all of these facts, taken together, affirmatively show that Valley is not a
of
The unitary .type of operation characteristic of branch bankmg is not present. The mere fact that First Bank Stock has
power to cause Valley to function as if it were a •
branch of Midland is not enough. * * * Paragraph 62 indicates a disagreement between the
parties as to the extent of control by First Bank
Stock which is 'possible.' Assuming that the possibility is unlimited, this is not the question. The
question is, has the control been so exercised as to
make Valley in fact a branch of Midland? Nothing in paragraph 62 indicates that it has." Id.,
306 F. 2d at 943.
As in that case, the influence of the holding company
over the Springville unit is not controlling and there is
no evidence whatever that any of the affiliated banks
exercise such influence or control; that one bank is doing
business as the instrumentality of the other, or vice
versa; or that a "unitary" operation exists. The details
of operation mentioned below further confirm the lack
of identity between the Springville unit and the affiliated banks, even as to First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A. which does business in the same county.
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Another leading decision favoring respondents is
that of Camden Trust Co. v. Gidney, 301 F. 2d 521
(D.C. Cir. 1962), cert denied, 369 U.S. 886 (1962), in
which the Court dealt with a new national bank (Delaware) which had been organized by nine individuals
who were directors of an existing national bank (Haddonfield) . Haddonfield had unsuccessfully sought to
locate a branch in Delaware Township, New Jersey,
when the state law prohibited any other state bank
branch there. After the Comptroller of the Currency
indicated his intention to approve the new charter, a
competing bank (Camden) brought suit. The decision
of the District Court adverse to plaintiff was affirmed
on appeal. In language significant to the present case
the Court stated:
"\iVhatever weight is to be given to the appellant's legal argument, it is difficult to think of
the Haddonfield directors' action as a 'subterfuge,' at least in an individious sense. On the contrary, the preliminary proceedings seem to have
been open and notorious. Perhaps on that account
the 'subterfuge' was alleged to be 'manifest.' The
president of the Haddonfield National Bank on
its letterhead notified all of its shareholders of the
plan and the objective which the directors sought.

* * *

"It fairly may be said that we perce:ve nothing
arcane or wrongfully covert in the effort." Id.,
301 F. 2d at 523.

After commenting that the organizers had themselves supplied the capital for Delaware, the new bank,
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rather than obtaining it from their existing bank, Haddonfield, the Court cited a number of distinctions between the two affiliated banks and held that the new
bank was a legitimate entity, and was not a branch of
the other:
"There is nothing in the record to show that the
shareholders formed the association 'for any other
than the legitimate objects contemplated by the
Act.' The Haddonfield National Bank has not
been shown to own the intervenor even if some of
the stockholders and directors of the former
should own some of the shares of the latter. The
intervenor clearly is not a branch of Haddonfield but is a completely separate entity with certain distinguishing
sufficiently so
set up in the Government's brief as to justify our
quoting verbatim:
'The capital structure of Delaware Valley is
totally independent of that of Haddonfield
National; the stock of Delaware Valley has
been subscribed to and "paid in" as required by
12 u.s.c. 53; ..•
'Delaware Valley will be located approximately two miles from the main office of
field National * * * the general busmess of
banking to be conducted by
will be transacted in the place specified m its
organization certificate (12 -q-.s.c . 81);
posits with Delaware Valley will be its
not that of Haddonfield National; loan
tions on Delaware Valley will be those applicable to an independent bank, based on its own
capital structure and totally
of
loan limitations applicable to Haddonfield .. ··

* * *
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"It. is
within our province to pass upon the
desirability vel non of permitting a national bank
to have an 'affiliate' as the appellant has here used
the term. If such an affiliate is to be denied status,
Congress must clearly say so. It is sufficient for
our disposition of the present controversy to observe that what was done was within the authoritv
conferred by existing statutes." Id., 301 F. 2d
524, 525.

The Billings case sustains the validity and corporate integrity of a new unit bank notwithstanding:
(I) it is directly affiliated with a bank doing business
in a neighboring city only two miles away; ( 2) some
common directors and ownership exist; and (c) the
state law would prohibit a branch of another bank in
the same loctaion. Except for the incidental factual
differences of holding company ownership and a state
charter in Springville, where there was a national
charter for Delaware Township, the Camden Trust
case is squarely in support of the validity of the holding
company's new unit bank and of its assertion that it is
not a "branch" of any other organization and does not
violate the state branch banking laws.
2. There exists no nexus between the First Security State Bank of Springville and First
Bank of Utah, N. A. sufficient to
categorize the former as a branch of the
latter.
Appellants in their briefs have attempted to list
a number of incidents of banking which they contend
dc'monstrate the presence of a "branch." In fact, most
of the incidents of bank management are typical of the
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ordinary, everyday management of a bank subsidiary
by holding companies throughout the country. As of
February, 1970, holding companies controlled
of the deposits in the country (although multi-ban!i
holding companies controlled only 15.4% of the total
deposits in the country-in that group were First Security Corporation, as well as Western Bancorporation
which controls Walker Bank & Trust Company, Salt
Lake City, Utah) (TR 17). Thus, if the First Security
State Bank of Springville is to be called a "branch,"
then over half of the deposits in the country are invested
in "branches," a conclusion which is somewhat startling,
but nevertheless compelled by the logic of appellants.
Some specific incidents of bank mangement deserve
comment in light of governing judicial decisions. First
to receive scrutiny is the impact of common ownership
and common management. Obviously, First Security
Corporation owns two national banks and two state
banks in addition to the unit at Springville. Some
common officers and directors exist among all the banks
and the holding company. However, each of the banks
has some directors who are not otherwise affiliated with
the system, and the corporation has many "public"
directors. The Springville unit has four of seven directors
who are not otherwise affiliated with First Security,
i.e.,
Haight, Nielsen, 'i\Thiting and Clyde. At
the present time, at least, the board has a majority of
"public" directors not affiliated with other parts of the
holding company system.
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In any event, common ownership and common
officers between banks will not make one a "branch"
or an "alter ego" of the other. Clearfield State Bank v.
Brimhall, 24 U. 2d 339, 471 P. 2d 161 (1970). That
dec;sion is deemed controlling in favor of First Security
Corporation's position in this matter. The relevant facts
and decision of the Court are expressed as follows:
"Appellant claims that the Bank of Utah, an
existing bank, not a party to this litigation, is the
real party in interest, and that the applicant,
Bank of Northern Utah, is but its alter ego or at
least its controlled
off-spring. It says
that controlling stoc11ownership will reside with
identical individuals as to both banks. 4 Plainiff
also points out that both banks will have the same
Cashier 5 who will work without compensation for
the new bank if authorized to operate.

* * *

"There is no question but that the Commissioner
received evidence of stock ownership and control
of the Bank of Utah and the Bank of Ben Lomond, neither a litigant here, which admittedly
would show at least similar ownership and control by certain individuals of the applicant here.

* * *

"A majority of the court is of the o_pinion that
irrespective of the evidence mentioned, apparently having to do with stock ownership in 0th.er
banks, and being of a type that would not
d1spositive here, the trial court should be aff1rmed
without qualification, and it is so ordered."
4This circumstance in and of itself is not controlling. Our
statutes do not prohibit such an arrangement ....
>4 Michie Banks & Banking, pp. 96-7: 'The powers and
duties
in virtue of his office, are much greater
than the president's, etc. * * *.'

Id., 24 U. 2d at 341.
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The following schedule evidences the separateness
of the State bank and the national bank controlled b,
. ts ecurity
. c orporat10n:
.
J
F irs
First Security State
Bank of Springville

First Security Bank
of Utah, N.A.

Organized under Section 7-126, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, and under
Section 7-3-7 is subject to the
Utah Business Corporation
Act, as well as all other provisions of Title 7, Chapters 1.
2 and 3.

Organized under the National
Bank Act (12 U.S. Code
et seq.).
'

Subject to examination by the
State Department of Financial
Institutions under Section 71-7.

Subject to examination by the
Comptroller of the Currency
and the National Examiners
under Section 12, U.S. Code
481.

Managed by a board of directors constituting four "public" directors and three First
Security men of whGm Georg2
S. Eccles is the only director
common to the national bank
(CT. 17).

Managed by a board of di·
rectors consisting of nine First
Security men and one (R. H.
Burton) public director (Exhibit 2-P, Page 8).

Capital, surplus and reserves
are entirely separate from any
other organization (Section 73-10 and 7-3-33). All funds
were paid in by the holding
company; no funds whatever
were contributed by an affiliated bank.

National banks have an en·
tirely different system of cap·
ital, surplus, undivided profits
and reserves ( 12 U.S. Code
161 and related sections).

Application for permission to
organize a bank requires financial statements of proposed officers and directors,
not of the incorporators (Com·
missioner Brimhall's forms).

Application for permission to
organize a national bank re·
quires financial statements of
the incorporators (Procedural
Manual of the Comptroller of
the Currency and Form 1955,
CCH Federal Banking Law
Reporter; Paragraph 60,00ll.

The cashier and manager reports directly to the board of
directors (CT. 19).

A complicated structure of di·
visions and intermediate man·
agers exists so that branch
managers have a considerable
hierarchy without direct ac·
cess to the board of directors
(Exhibit 2-P).
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First Security State
Bank of Springville

First Security Bank
of Utah, N.A.

Manager has no loan limit
other than that imposed by
law, which is 15 per cent of
the capital and surplus (Section 7-3-39). Loan requests
need not be submitted to anyone, although larger loans
have been discussed with the
directcrs, especially the "public" directors (CT. 23, 31).

The loan limit is 10 per cent
ol the capital stock and surplus (12 U.S. Code 84). However, each branch manager
has certain limits and must
seek approval of higher officers (CT. 23, 31).

The accounting system is different and the manager is required to request assistance
from the holding company for
investment of excess funds
(CT. 24).

The excess funds are automatically invested by the central
department or head office
(CT. 24).

Accounting procedures
manual (CT. 25).

Accounting is all on the computer (CT. 25).

The
right
even
have
wide

are

manager has complete
to hire his employees
though the employees
benefits under a systemplan (CT. 26, 27).

Deposits and orders of withdrawal on checking or savings
accounts cannot be received
with respect to any other
banks (CT. 29).

A cashier's check from the
state bank can constitute a deposit (CT. 29).

A "bundle" of forms and applications were necessary for
dealing with the Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, as well as Utah unemployment reports, tax reports
and other such reports which
are necessary because of the
separate identity of the state
bank (CT. 32).

Each branch deals through the
head office and does not need
separate authorizations or reports for the regulatory agencies.

Loans in excess of the lending
limit can be submitted to or a
T)articipation sold to any affiliated bank. The same as if
an unaffiliated larger bank
were used as a correspondent
bank (Exhibit P-1).
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The above analysis, together with the list of discompel the conclusion that the Springville
umt bank is not a "branch" of First Security Bank of
Utah, N.A.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FIRST
SECURITY STATE BANK OF SPRINGVILLE IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF PUBLIC
POLICY.
Both appellants in their briefs have raised the issue
of a "concentration of powers" in relation to the issue of
public policy. Aside from the fact that there was virtually
no support or authority given for appellants' contention,
the issue is in fact more inflammatory than analytical.
No evidence has been presented on this issue and no violation of federal and state law is claimed. Further, the
Federal Reserve Board, acting pursuant to the federal
law (cited earlier) specifically determined that no problem in this area would be created by approving the holding company's acquisition (Fed. Res. Bull. Dec. 1970,
p. 952). It is further observed that under § 3 of the Bank
Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. § 1842), the U.S.
Department of Justice has 30 days after the Board's
decision in which to file an action on antitrust grounds
and no action has been initiated. Moreover, the establish·
ment of a de novo bank in a market previously served by
only one bank (Central Bank & Trust Company had n
monopoly in Springville for many years) is precisely the
procedure by which the Justice Department believes
competition is enhanced. In August, 1971, the Justice
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Department issued its "Research Paper and Policy
Statement of the United States Department of Justice
Regarding State Legislation Affecting the Structure of
Banking Markets." After discussing the background of
competitive considerations as affected by state and federal banking laws, the following statement was made
which fully supports respondents' contentions here:
"Usually, the legislative insulation of banking
markets from new competition is accomplished by
flat prohibitions on branching or by geographical
restrictions on the areas in which banks may operate branch offices. These latter limitations typically prevent outside banks from entering specific areas by branching de novo or merging. Geographic restrictions on entry into new markets are
often supplemented by "home office protection"
statutes, which prohibit the opening of de novo
branches in communities where the main office
of another bank is located. The tendency of restrictions of this type is to increase concentration
as competitors within the insulated areas respond
to normal growth pressures. Because entry by
out/side banks is restricted, increased internal concentration through mergers among competitors
may seem desirable as a means of providing service benefits which appear to outweigh increases in
concc:tlration. We suggest, however, that actual
de nova entry of new competitors may
efm a
fectively provide the structural
banking market which are needed m order to
eliminate a noncompetitive atmosphere, or to
meet unsatisfied banking needs. Where the communities affected are large and growing, geographic restrictions may substantially limit
sired consumer options with respect to both price
and service."
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Appellants were also unwilling to examine the other
side of the coin; namely, that the support of First Security Corporation is beneficial to the community of
Springville. It is a
of strength, rather than weakness, inasmuch as more capital and employment opportunities are brought into that small community. Appellants' argument that the profits will go to Salt Lake City
is not representative of the facts. The very nature of the
banking business will require the re-investing of additional capital in Springville in order to take care of the
growing loan demand in the local area. This will not be
a "siphoning" from the local area.
III. THE TECHNICAL OBJECTIONS BY APPELLANTS TO FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION'S APPLICATION ARE WITHOUT VALIDITY.
A. First Security Corporation Is a Proper Applicant for the Establishment of a New Unit Bank
in Springville.
1. Section 7-1-26, properly interpreted, applies

to bank holding companies.
Appellants Child, et al. in effect have made much
ado about nothing in raising a semantic issue as to
the interpretation of Section 7-1-26 U.C.A., 1953, as
amended. First Security Corporation, as a registered
bank holding company pursuant to the Bank Holdi.ng
Company Act of 1956, is, in fact, the only party which
can file an application with the Federal Reserve Board
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for permission to acquire shares of the proposed unit

bank. It would be incongruous to require the holding
company to apply for permission under the federal law
but require a party other than the holding company to
apply under the state law. Even so, the applicable state
statute is entirely in harmony with the governing federal
laws and regulations. Obviously, the discussion of the
Whitney and Neally cases under Point I above should
be kept in mind as evidencing the primacy of federal law
where a holding company is concerned.
It is true that Section 7-1-26 in stating the essential

procedures for organizing a new unit bank refers to "the
incorporators or organizers." There is also a reference,
however, to the "applicant." Appellants Child, et al.,
grasping at straws, contend that the application must be
in the name of an individual rather than the holding
company and thus seek a tortured and unfounded interpretation of the statute. First, there is no indication that
the "applicant" (singular) must be the individual incorporators rather than some other interested party; in
fact, the use of a singular term indicates that an entity
such as a bank holding company may be an applicant.
Such must be assumed in the absence of any legislative
intent to the contrary.
In addition to using the word "applicant" twice in
subsections (3) and (4) of Section 7-1-26, subsection
( 1) makes a distinction between "incorporators" and
"organizers," suggesting that an organizer may be some
other party than the individual incorporators. Thus, in
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the present case, First Security Corporation is the "organizer" whose fitness is to be considered along with that
of the "individual incorporators." Further, the Commilsioner is given ''discretionary power" in the approval of
Articles of Incorporation of banks, which discretion includes the right to determine who may be an "applicant.''
Such discretion as used in the present case is founded on
principles of statutory interpretation:
"When two words or expressions are coupled together, one of which generally includes the other,
it is obvious that the more general term is used in
a meaning excluding this specific one." 'Vilson,
M ax'wetl on I nterpreta.tion of Statutes §320 (11th
ed. 1968).
The term "organizers" being more general than "incorporators" excludes "incorporators" and means something other than "incorporators," such as a holding com·
pany which is the moving force behind the bank.
As to the word "applicant:"
"Ordinarily they (words of the statute) are to be
given their usual, natural, plain, ordinary, and
commonly understood meaning, and strict gram·
matical usage will not necessarily control over the
general and popular usage of the word." 82
C.J.S. Statutes, §329 ( d).
Ordinarily, "applicant" means one who has applied;
the statute does permit an application by any person or
entity capable of making such application. It is further
to be noted:
"In determining either the general object of thr
Legislature or the meaning of any particular pas·
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sage, it is obvio.us that the
which appears
to be the most m accord with convenience reason
justice and legal principles should, in all 'cases of
doubtful significance, be presumed to be the true
one." Wilson, M(),Xwell on Interpretation of Statutes, §183 (11th ed. 1962).
The most meaningful interpretation of Section 71-26 is that it was not intended to screen out certain
would-be applicants, but was rather intended to allow the
Commissioner himself to do the screening.
Lastly, a study of the legislative history of Section
7-1-26 is supportive of respondents' position. Section 44
of chapter 25 of the Laws of Utah, 1911, provided that
the Bank Commissioner approve the Articles of Incorporation, but that he could withhold his approval if he
found, inter alia, that the incorporators "are professional
bank incorporators." The reference to professional bank
incorporators was deleted in 1933, and has not been reinstituted in any subsequent statutes. This is a clear indication that there is no prohibition against such "professionals" as First Security Corporation organizing a
unit bank under present law.
In 1925, under Chapter 43, Section 18 of the Laws
of Utah the Bank Commissioner was to examine the
'
character of the "incorporators or organizers," and this
was the first use of the term "organizers" as an alternative to the term "incorporators." Certainly this word,
added where it had not been present before, was placed
in the statute for a reason. In 1963 Section 7-1-26 was put
in its present form to include a reference to the "appli-
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cant" as noted above. It is obvious that this additio
.
d
agam, ad ed where no such word had been previously
used, was in recognition of a modern-day fact that a person or a corporation other than the incorporators (of
whom there must be at least three) needs the right to file
an application with the Commissioner. In sum, even
when we examine the sematic technicalities, First Security Corporation may still be said to be a proper applicant.
2. Federal decisions support the respondents' po-

sition.

In a number of decisions of the Federal Reserve
Board issued during the period of time while the appli·
cation of First Security Corporation has been in process,
and thereafter, the bank commissioners in various states
have approved organization of state chartered banks in
each instance knowing that a holding company was the
principal organizer. In the cases cited, the Federal Re·
serve Board also gave its approval. The cumulative ef·
feet of such decisions is indicative of a public policy in
favor of holding companies as the moving force behind
the applications. The statutes in several of the states have
significant similarity to the Utah statute Section 7-1-26.
and in some instances the statutes specifically require
that an application be filed in the name of the individual
"incdt>orators" (unlike the Utah statute which is more
broadly worded). It is thus a fair assumption that hold·
ing companies as the "organizers" of the various banks
were approved by the State Bank Commissioners.
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Because such cases abound in the pages of the
monthly Federal Reserve Bulletin and because the cases
are generally of the same nature, with similar factual
situations, a detailed analysis of each decision is not
called for. Rather, a brief mention of the more recent
decisions will suffice to demonstrate respondents' contention:
:FLORIDA. In the matter of the application of
Exchange Bancorporation, Inc. a registered
bank holding company, Tampa, Florida, for approval of acquisition of 100% of the voting shares
(less directors' qualifying shares) of Exchange
Bank of North Winter Haven, Winter Haven,
Florida, a proposed new bank, the Commissioner
of Banking of the State of Florida recommended
approval of the petition, after which the Federal
Reserve Board granted such approval. Fed. Res.
Bull., Ap. '71, p. 339.
Similar approvals of acquisitions of state banks
by bank holding companies in Florida include:
In the matter of the application of Barnett Banks
of Florida, Inc .... for ... acquisition of ... the
American Bank in Auburndale, Auburndale,
Florida, ... (Fed. Res. Bull. Nov. '70, p. 833);
In the matter of the application of Barnett Banks
of Florida, Inc., ... for approval of acquisition of
... Barnett Bank of Orlando, Orlando, Florida,
... (Fed. Res. Bull. Aug. '70, p. 650); In the
matter of the application of Barnett Bank of
Florida, Inc., ... for approval of acquisition of
Barnett Bank of Daytona Beach, Florida,
(Fed. Res. Bull. Feb. '70, p. 157) .
Concerning the application to a bank commissioner for
the organization of a bank Florida law provides that a
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banking corporation must be formed by five or more
persons (Fla. Stat., Vol. 2, §659.01). The statutes also
require that the application filed with the department
include:
"The name, residence and occupation of each incorporator and stock subscriber.... " Fla. Stat
Vol. 2, §659.02.
·
Under Section 659.03, the department is to investigate:
"The character, reputation, financial status ana
motives of the organizers, incorporators and subscribers in organizing the proposed bank or trust
company." Fla. Stat., Vol. 2, §659.03.
Note that the Florida statute, similiar to the Utah stat·
ute (Section 7-1-26) uses the alternative terms "incor·
porators" and "organizers." In addition, the Florida
statute mentions "subscribers." Thus, judging from the
approved acquisitions noted above, a Florida holding
company may be an organizer and a subscriber even
though individuals must be incorporators.
VIRGINIA. In the matter of the application of
Virginia Commonwealth Bankshares, Inc. . . ·
for approval of acquisition of ... Virginia of Ro·
anoke Valley, Vinton, Virginia ... (Fed. Re:.
Bull., Ap. '71, p. 335) ; In the matter of the apph·
cation of First Virginia Bankshares Corporatwn.
. . . for approval of acquisition .... of
and Trust Company, Colonial Heights, Vll'gmia
... (Fed. Res.
Mar. '7.1, p.
.; In
matter of the application of First Virgima
shares Corporation, ... for approval of
tion of ... First Atlantic Bank, Hampton, V1r·
ginia ... (Fed. Res. Bull., June '70, p. 533).
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'i\TI
In. the matter of the applicatiou
of Security Fmancial Services, Inc., ... for approval of acquisition of ... Security Westside
Bank, Sheboygan, Wisconsin, . . . (Fed. Res.
Bull.Nov. '7o, p. 834).
\Visconsin law requires that a state bank be incorporated by not less than seven nor more than twenty persons, and further that the application be filed by the applicants who are the incorporators. Wisconsin Statutes
1967, Vol. 2, §221.01. The latter provision is even more
strict than the Utah statute which does not expressly require that the application be signed and filed by the individual incorporators. Thus, even though Wisconsin
law requires the individuals to be named, the proceedings
before the bank commissioner were conducted with
knowledge that 80 % or more of the shares would be
purchased by the bank holding company. Hence no conflict exists when individuals sign as incorporators even
though most of the shares will be sold to a holding company.
CALIFORNIA. In the matter of the application of Central Banking System, Inc., ... for approval of acquisition of . . . Bank of Fairfield,
Fairfield, California, . . . (Fed. Res. Bull., June
'70, p. 530).
California law requires that a bank corporation be incorporated by three or more persons. Calif. Fin. Code,
§350 ('Vest 1970). Further, the California law provides
for the investigation of the character and reputation of
"the organizers or incorporators. . . ." as well as the
character of the "proposed stockholders and directors."
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Calif. Fin. Code, §361 (West 1971). Again a distinction
is found between "organizers," "incorporators," auu
"stockholders." Apparently, in the cited decision, the
holding company was to purchase a controlling share o[
the stock and was the moving party behind organiiatiun
of the bank on the state level. Therefore, the holdina
.
company itself was an organizer and a stockholder eveu
though the natural persons acting on behalf of the hold.
ing company had to be the incorporators.
IOWA. In the matter of the application ol'
Brenton Banks, Inc., ... for approval of acquisition of ... Northwest Brenton Bank and Trus!
Company, Urbandale, Iowa, ... (Fed. Res. Bull.,
May '70, p. 463). The superintendent of the De·
partment of Banking for the State of Iowa had
tentatively approved the chartering of the new
bank with knoweldge that it would become a subsidiary of the holding company and did not sub·
mit other comments to the Board.
Iowa law requires that individual incorporators make an
application to the Superintendent of Banking for ap·
proval of a proposed state bank, in contrast to the Utah
statute (Section 7-1-26) which does not require that the
application to the banking authority be signed or filea
in the names of the individual incorporators. Iowa Code
Ann. §524.030. Significantly, the Iowa statutes do not
use the alternative term "organizer."

OTHER STATES. A number of other statei
have recently approved the acquisition of. sfale
banks bv holding companies.
m th
Federal· Reserve Bulle.tin for September,
are Board approvals m the states of OHI ·
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TEXAS, FLORIDA, MARYLAND, INDIAN A, DELAWARE, and MISSOURI. In the
Federal Bulletin of August, 1971: ARIZONA,
MINNESOTA, VIRGINIA, MICHIGAN,
and NEW HAMPSHIRE. And in July of
1.971,
This list is only representative and is by no means conclusive.
In sum, the above-noted activity in sister states is certainly indicative of the emptiness of appellants' argument that incorporations are prohibited from forming
banks.

B. First Security Corporation's Status as a Foreign
Corporation is no Bar to the Organization of the
First Security State Bank of Springville.
Appellants Child, et al., nominally, and without evidence or authority, introduced the argument concerning
First Security's status as a foreign corporation. However, the nature of the business activities in which First
Security Corporation is engaged does not require that it
obtain a certificate of authority to do business from the
Secretary of State. First Security Corporation is exempted from qualifying to do business in this state, in
part by the following statute:
"'V ithout excluding other activities which may
not constitute transacting business in this state, a
foreign corporation shall not be considered to be
for
P?rpose
transacting business in this
of this act, by reason of
on !his state
any one or more of the f ollowmg act1v1ties:

(a) maintaining or def ending any action or
or any administrative or arbitration proceedmg,

43

or effecting the settlement thereof or the sett\.
ment of claims or disputes. * * *
e
( d) maintaining off ices or agencies for the trans.
fer, exchange and registration of its securities or
a PJ?Ointing and maintaining trustees or
taries with relation to its securities.** *
securing or collecting debts or enforcing am
rights in property securing the same .... " U.C.A:,
§16-10-102 (2 Supp. 1969) amending, U.C.A
§16-10-102 (1953).

Among the "other activities which may not constitutt
transacting business in this state," mentioned generall)
above is the ownership by a holding company of stock or
other corporations which are required to pay taxes in
the state. In this connection it is to be noted that th1
Corporation Franchise Tax Act exempts First Securit)
Corporation from paying the franchise tax because it b
one of the:
" ( 16) Corporations whose sole business consist!
of holding the stock of other corporations for
purpose of controlling the management of affam
of such other corporations, if such other corpora·
tions make returns under this chapter." U.C.A

§59-13-4 ( 16) ( 1953).

By reason of the specific exemption from the franchi)i
tax under Section 59-13-4, and the very apt descriptiol
of the business activities of the holding company 6
pressly declared by Section 16-10-102 as not
ing transaction of business in the State of Utah,
Security Corporation has not been required to obtarn
certificate of authority from the Secretary of State.
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The argument by appellants regarding public policy against the alleged "outsiders" is blind to the fact
that First Security Corporation has always maintained
its offices in Ogden or Salt Lake City, and that it is a
corporation over which the Secretary of State, the Tax
Commission and the Commissioner of Financial Institutions can obtain jurisdiction for protection of the banks
with which the public do business. The matter is now
moot inasmuch as the corporation became qualified on
November 12, 1970, for reasons unrelated to this suit.
Lastly, it is significant that Section 7-1-26 does not
require the "organizers" of a bank to be residents of the
state. Nor does Section 16-10-48 require that "incorporators" be residents of the state. In sum, appellants' argument must fail.
C. The Commissioner's Denial of the Child et al.
Application as Being Later in Time Than That
of First Security Corporation was Proper.
The Child, et al., appellants, in an unauthoritative and unevidentiary contention, complain that the
test of "priority in time" of the applications is arbitrary.
'fhe statutes do not require or permit the Commissioner
to weigh competing applications to determine which is
"best." Rather, the Commissioner is given discretion in
granting applications. If an application has already been
granted, and the Commissioner determines that there is
no justification for an additional bank in the city, any
second, third, fourth or fifth application becomes moot.
'fhis is a rational decision and not aribtrary or capricious.
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The Child, et al., appellants had a complete hearing on
their application and also appeared as protestants at the
First Security hearing. They were not denied any dut
process of law.
Further, in many areas of the law, he who is prior
in time gains an advantage. See e.g., Section 70A-9-3n
U.C.A. 1953, ( 1968), which lists priorities amon1
conflicting security interests in the same collateral, anc
under subsection ( 5) states that in certain cases priori·
ties shall be determined by either the order (in time) ol
filing, the order of perfection or the order of attachment
The Court is also very familiar with priorities in real
estate matters as determined solely by the time of filing.
even down to a difference of minutes.
With respect to the propriety of an administrative
official's act of granting an application on the basis ul
first in time to file, such basis is equitable, legal ana
proper, even if two applicants are equally qualified for
the privilege sought. In Michie on Banks and Banking,
Vol. 1, pages 126-127, it is stated:

It is generally held that when there
a
compliance with the statutory and constitutional
prerequisites for the organization of a bank,
the duty of the state officer to issue the certifi.
cate is ministerial and he cannot refuse to wan!
the charter.*** Even where equally meritor10ui
applications for charter for several banks in ilit
same community are pending before the charter
board at the same time, and the charter board de·
termines against the necessity for more
bank, there is still no discretion; the application
first presented should be granted.
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This principle was applied by the Banking Board
of the State of Kansas and the Supreme Court of Kansas
in sustaining its action stated in Schaake v. Dolley, 118
P. 80 (Kan. 1911):
"Two equally deserving applications were pending before the charter board at the same time. The
statute makes no provision for a choice in such
cases, and the charter board did right in granting
the one first filed." Id., 118 P. at 87.
The Utah statutes do not prescribe the procedure
to be followed when two applications are filed for a bank
in the same community. It is evident, however, from the
foregoing that the Commissioner may properly grant
the application first filed when the applicants are equally
qualified.
In regard to appellants' allegation that the Commissioner acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying
appellants' motion for Additional and Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order, the Court's attention is directed to an annotation in 73 A.L.R. 2d 939 on
the power of an administrative body, in the absence of
specific statutory authority, to reconsider a cause previously determined by a final decision or to modify its
decision. In substance, this annotation points out that
there is a lack of uniformity in the court decisions on this
subject, with some holding that administrative bodies
have inherent or implied power to reconsider or modify
their decisions; some holding that they may not reconsider or modify their decisions for the reason that there
would be no end
litigation if they could; others hold-
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ing that the statutes granting powers to administratir.
bodies must be examined as a whole to ascertain the lev
islative intent, and still others holding that where judici:
review is provided the administrative decision may nr,
be reviewed.
In line with the latter point of view, the Suprem·
Court of Arizona in Magna Copper Co. v. Arizona Sta/.
Tax Commission, 191 P.2d 169 (1948), considern
whether or not the Arizona Tax Commission could
aside its order denying plaintiff's protest on a tax
ment and hold further hearings. In holding that it coulr
not, the Court said:
"If the Commission in entering said order wn
performing merely a ministerial act, such actirn
was not necessarily final. If, on the other hand,it
entering said order it was exercising a judici:
function, the authorities uniformly hold that sucl
action exhausts its jurisdiction unless the statuk
by separate grant authorize further action.

* * *

"The fact that the legislature provided for anaf
peal from the dec.ision of
the hearing provided for m Section 73-153:
supra, is to our mind, conclusive
thalt
intended that said decision should be fmal an
that said appeal should constitute the exclus;1,
remedy of appellant." Id., 191 P. 2d at 171, 111
In J(ennecott Copper Corp. v. Employment Si
curity Commission, 432 P.2d 109 (N.M. 1967), ti
.
held th·
Commission, after a hearing by an exammer,
members of a union who were not on strike but wl
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refused to cross picket lines were entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. Kennecott appealed this
decision to the Commission itself. The Commission affirmed its decision, and Kennecott then appealed to the
court from this second decision by the Commission. The
question raised by this procedure was whether or not the
Commission could rehear its first decision and whether
or not Kennecott lost its right of appeal to the Court because it did not file notice of the appeal within fifteen
days after the Commission's decision. The court held that
the first decision was final and therefore Kennecott lost
its right of appeal to the court:
"If further proceedings before the Commission
by appeal or reconsideration are allowed or authorized the right to entertain such action by the
Commission must exist by implication. It is a fundamental rule of construction that when a power
is conferred by statute everything necessary to
carry out the power and make it effective and
complete will be implied. . . .

* * *

"The express power granted the Co1?mission by
the legislature which is relevant to this
is
quasi-judicial in its nature and .authonzes the
Commission to decide issues submitted under the
labor dispute section, § 59-9-5 ( d). The right of
the Commission to investigate facts and law
deemed by it to be material to a decision is u.nlimited. After the Commission has rendered its
decision it has exercised the express power conferred by the act u.Pon it. No .logical
appears to us for holdmg that a nght of reconsideration is necessary in carrying out the express
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power. We further note here that judicial revie11
as to any decision of the
s10n. Id., 432 P. 2d at 113.
Even if we were to assume that the Commissioner
could amend his Findings of Fact, Conclusions
Order in accordance with the appellants' motion, tn1
Commissioner was not acting arbitrarily and capriciom
ly in refusing to do so. The Findings of Fact issued 01
the Commissioner stated that "there is no present justi.
fication for two additional banks in Springville." Therr
was no reason why he should provide that appellant1
application would be effective at some future time inilit
event First Security Corporation's application
fail by reason of litigation or its failure to obtain the ap·
prov al from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporatiou
for insurance on its accounts and approval from ilir
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for
it to own the new bank. These events have never har
pened.
CONCLUSION
This case is one of great importance to the partit
Unless the Court is forced to conclude for severe reasor:
that the decision of the Commissioner Brimhall was a!
bitrary, capricious or contrary to law, the Commissiont
must be upheld.
The case is also one of first impression in Utah an
carries implications of interest to the entire
dustry in the state. The record reflects that at least ni
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other holding companies own and operate banks in Utah.
In this age, the bank holding company is a reality and
has been specifically recognized by federal statutes and
by the statutes in many other states. With this in mind, a
tortured interpretation of the statutes based on semantic
technicalities, as urged by appellants, is inappropriate.
Rather, the decision of the Federal Reserve Board, a
group of uniquely qualified experts given sole jurisdiction in these matters by federal law, should be controlling on the holding company and anti-competitive
considerations, and given great weight in this Court's
own determination of whether a holding company may
organize a de novo state bank and may do so without falling under the restrictions of "branch bank" statutes.
Based on all of the factual and legal considerations
discussed at length in the foregoing Argument, respondents urge that this Court affirm the judgment of the
lower court.
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